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Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione
''Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione'' (1677) or ''On The Improvement Of The Understanding'', is a seventeenth-century unfinished work of philosophy by the 17th century philosopher Baruch Spinoza.
The ''Tractatus'' was first published in 1677, the year of Spinoza's death, by some of his closest friends, along with other works including the ''Ethica'' and the ''Tractatus Politicus''.〔Ludovico Geymonat, "Storia del Pensiero Scientifico e Filosofico" (History of Science and Philosophy). Ed. Garzanti, 1970, Italy.〕 The ''Tractatus'' is an attempt to formulate a philosophical method that would allow the mind to form the clear and distinct ideas that are necessary for its perfection. It contains, in addition, reflection upon the various kinds of knowledge, an extended treatment of definition, and a lengthy analysis of the nature and causes of doubt. The characteristic of the work is the discussion of different form of perception at Chapter IV and illustration of the best one in relation with the experience and intelligence at the next Chapter. He also addresses the issues of memory and forgetting.
==Theory of knowledge==
Spinoza commenced this treatise with the intention of digging deep into the problem of Knowledge, but the work was never completed. In his other works epistemological discussions are intimately linked with the rest of his philosophy. Indeed, even in the ''Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding'' epistemological views are almost inseparably connected with ethical and religious ones. That is the consequence of his characteristic conception of "Knowledge". For Spinoza "Knowledge" is "life", not in the sense that contemplation is the highest life, but in the sense that knowledge is the means of holding together the threads of life in a systematic unity that can fill its proper place in the cosmic system. In this sense the effort after the highest knowledge becomes part of the cosmic activities by which cosmic unity is maintained, and so part of the very life of God.〔For this section cf. espec. Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911), Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. ''S.v.'' "Spinoza" — see also ''int. al.'', A. Wolf's, ''Spinoza; His Life and treatise on God and Man'', London, 1933; Richard McKeon, ''The Philosophy of Spinoza: The Unity of His Thought'', Ox Bow Pr., 1928; Ray Monk & Frederic Raphael, ''The Great Philosophers''. Phoenix, 2000, ''s.v.'' "Spinoza", pp. 135-174.〕
There are two things which must be borne in mind in connection with Spinoza's conception of knowledge. The first is his insistence on the ''active'' character of knowledge. The ideas or concepts by means of which thought construes reality are not like "lifeless pictures on a panel"; they are activities by which reality is apprehended; they are part of reality, and reality is activity. The second point is that Spinoza does not divorce knowing from willing. Man always acts according to his lights. If a man's endeavours appear to fall short of his knowledge, that is only because his knowledge is not really what it is held to be, but is wanting in some respect. On the one hand, reason, for Spinoza, is essentially the "practical reason". On the other hand, the highest expression of willing is experienced in that striving for consistency and harmony which is so characteristic of reason. For Spinoza, then, as for Francis Bacon and all the Renaissance thinkers, "Knowledge is power", but in a much deeper sense than Bacon intended.
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